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Abstract: There exists considerable uncertainty over both shale and conventional gas resource
availability and extraction costs, as well as the fugitive methane emissions associated with shale
gas extraction and its possible role in mitigating climate change. This study uses a multi-region
energy system model, TIAM (TIMES integrated assessment model), to consider the impact of a range
of conventional and shale gas cost and availability assessments on mitigation scenarios aimed at
achieving a limit to global warming of below 2 ◦C in 2100, with a 50% likelihood. When adding
shale gas to the global energy mix, the reduction to the global energy system cost is relatively small
(up to 0.4%), and the mitigation cost increases by 1%–3% under all cost assumptions. The impact
of a “dash for shale gas”, of unavailability of carbon capture and storage, of increased barriers to
investment in low carbon technologies, and of higher than expected leakage rates, are also considered;
and are each found to have the potential to increase the cost and reduce feasibility of meeting global
temperature goals. We conclude that the extraction of shale gas is not likely to significantly reduce
the effort required to mitigate climate change under globally coordinated action, but could increase
required mitigation effort if not handled sufficiently carefully.
Keywords: shale gas; natural gas; supply curves; climate change mitigation; energy system
analysis; energy scenarios; TIMES Integrated Assessment Model (TIAM); fugitive methane emissions;
energy economics
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been considerable global and regional interest in shale gas, which,
it has been widely suggested, could play a role as a bridging fuel to a low-carbon future. There
remains, however, considerable uncertainty over both shale and conventional gas resource availability
and extraction costs, as well as the fugitive methane emissions associated with shale gas extraction.
This leads to considerable uncertainty in the role which shale gas could play in mitigating climate
change. This paper quantifies uncertainties in supply and fugitive emissions, and uses a model of the
global energy system to quantify the impact of these uncertainties on global energy supply mix and
the cost of mitigation scenarios.
This paper is organized as follows. The remainder of Section 1 provides a description of shale gas
and how it differs from conventional gas, outlines reasons its extraction has been proposed, the known
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risks, and how energy system modelling can help us to understand its role. Section 2 provides an
overview of the literature on shale and conventional gas supply and costs, and fugitive methane
leakage associated with the extraction of shale gas. Section 2 also provides an overview of previous
studies considering the role of shale gas in the future energy system, and identifies an analytical gap
considering the implications of aforementioned uncertainties in 2 ◦C-consistent mitigation scenarios.
Section 3 describes the TIMES Integrated Assessment Model (TIAM)-Grantham energy system model,
and the manner in which it is used to address this gap. Section 4 presents results emerging from this
study, including energy system and mitigation costs, the share of natural gas as a whole and shale gas
specifically in primary energy mix, and rates of decarbonisation in a range of supply and cost scenarios.
The impact of carbon capture and storage (CCS), cost of capital for other low-carbon technologies,
and a “dash for shale gas” on cost and supply mix are considered, and selected region-specific results
presented. Section 5 provides a discussion of the implications of this study for the possible role of
shale gas in global climate change mitigation, and offers concluding remarks.
1.1. What Is Shale Gas and How Does It Differ from Conventional Gas?
Shale gas represents natural gas trapped within shale rock formations. Historically, gas has
mostly been extracted from more porous rocks such as sandstone (referred to as conventional gas
extraction). Shale is less porous, and requires horizontal drilling, and hydraulic fracturing (also known
as “fracking”), in order to enable gas to flow from a well. Both of these technologies have also been
used in conventional gas extraction [1], but shale is harder and less brittle than rocks in conventional
formations, and techniques to frack shale with confidence have only been developed by American
energy companies in the last 10–20 years, leading to the technique becoming more widespread [2].
A set of discovered, undiscovered or possible natural gas accumulations that exhibit similar
geological characteristics is often referred to as a “play”. Shale plays are located within basins, which are
large-scale geologic depressions, often hundreds of miles across, which also may contain other oil
and natural gas resources (the term field appears to be used to refer both to individual plays and to
entire basins, so we avoid the use of the term “field” in this paper) [3]. The US Energy Information
Administration (EIA) [4] identifies shale plays in the USA which vary in size from hundreds to tens
of thousands of square miles. More than 80% of shale gas production in the US comes from five of
the largest plays [5]. During a mining operation, a number of wells will be constructed within such
a play, from which gas will be extracted. Density of wells is variable, but the International Energy
Agency (IEA) [6] indicates that shale gas extraction typically requires a significantly higher density of
wells (more than one well per square kilometre identified in the Barnett play) than conventional gas
(estimated at less than one well per ten square kilometres).
McGlade et al. [7] identify two other unconventional sources of gas: tight gas trapped in relatively
impermeable hard rock, and coal bed methane (CBM) trapped in coal seams. These unconventional
sources do not form the core of this study, but are discussed in the model results.
1.2. Why Has Shale Gas Extraction Been Proposed?
The possible role of shale gas in a future energy system has been the subject of much debate over
recent years. Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in the US led to a tenfold increase in production of
shale gas between 2006 and 2010, and reached 47% of total U.S. dry natural gas production in 2013.
Over this period, wellhead gas prices, and gas imports into the US, have both fallen significantly [8].
The possibility of emulating this phenomenon worldwide has led to further exploration of reserves in
other regions, and led the IEA to describe natural gas as “poised to enter a golden age” [6].
The CO2 emissions associated with electricity generation from combustion of natural gas are
approximately half of those produced when generating electricity from coal. Between 2007 and
2013, CO2 emissions in the USA are reported to have fallen by 11% [9], and a 4% reduction in CO2
emissions over this period has been attributed to a shift in the fuel consumption mix from coal to
natural gas, with a decrease in consumption volume and changes in production structure making
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up other significant contributing factors [10]. In addition, gas turbines are able to provide flexible
generation, helping to balance supply form intermittent renewable electricity sources such as wind
and solar photovoltaics [11]. These factors combined have led some analysts and political leaders
to conclude that natural gas could play an important role in supplying world energy needs over the
coming decades as we transition to a less carbon-intensive energy system, with the US President
Barack Obama describing fracking as a “bridge” to a clean energy future [12].
1.3. What Are the Known Risks?
A number of economic and environmental risks have been associated with widespread extraction
of shale gas. These risks arise from uncertainties in resource size, extraction costs, the potential
long-term lock-in to gas when climate targets require a move to lower-carbon technologies coupled
with diversion of funds from lower carbon technologies, fugitive methane emissions, as well as local
environmental impacts and acceptability [2,13].
There is significant uncertainty in the size of the global shale gas resource, which has so far
largely been assessed on the basis of the size of shale formations, and assumed gas concentrations.
Due to limited experience with shale gas, particularly outside of the United States, there have
been relatively few estimates of shale gas extraction costs, none of which could yet be described
as authoritative. Literature on the global shale gas resource and depletion is explored in more detail in
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, and literature on extraction costs in Section 2.4.
The rate of fugitive methane leakage from shale gas extraction is a crucial factor in determining
the climate impact of shale gas extraction. Methane has a significantly higher global warming potential
than CO2 (86 times higher over a 20 year timeframe, and 34 times higher over a 100 year time
frame [14]) due to the differing absorption profiles and atmospheric lifetimes of the two gases. As such,
if leakage rates are higher than around 4%, the 20-year climate benefits of using gas rather than coal
for electrical power are eradicated [15]. Leakage rates ranging from less than 0.5% to above 10% have
been reported across hydraulic fracturing sites, using different measurement methodologies. A more
detailed overview of literature on leakage rates is provided in Section 2.3.
Other concerns not considered in detail in this report include the impact of hydraulic fracturing
to surface water, air, and land, around which hydraulic fracturing is subject to exemptions from a
number of regulations in the US [16], and strong local opposition in some communities [17]. A draft
report from the US Environmental Protection Agency [18] concludes contamination of drinking water
associated with hydraulic fracturing has taken place, although on what scale remains unclear. The local
environmental impacts of shale gas extraction are discussed in Hirst et al. [2], and the importance of
information collection, access, and dissemination to support evidence-based shale gas policies are
outlined by Gamper-Rabindran [19].
1.4. What Can Energy System Modelling Tell Us about the Role of Shale Gas?
Computational modelling of the energy system represents a powerful approach for planning,
capable of providing indication of possible energy system pathways, and the impact of technology and
resource costs and availabilities, and emissions constraints on the costs and feasibilities of achieving
these pathways [20,21]. As such, we consider the modelling of the global energy system an appropriate
tool for evaluating the impact of shale gas on the cost and feasibility of meeting climate targets.
Energy system models are nonetheless subject a number of limitations. Firstly, these models rely
on the availability of data of sufficiently high quality for many aspects of the global energy system,
when in reality there are multiple uncertainties around key inputs such as socio-economic trends,
technology innovations and fossil fuel resources. Secondly, these models are often based upon optimal
decisions. However, global energy systems do not behave cost-optimally, and political, social and
behavioural factors are challenging to include within the framework of an energy systems model.
Thirdly, these models typically assume perfect foresight of future energy needs, technology costs and
fossil fuel supply costs, which will not be the case in practice. In the context of these limitations,
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exact numerical results are likely to differ between models depending upon their implicit assumptions.
As such, more value should be attributed to general trends, directions and orders of magnitude of
results than exact numerical values.
2. Literature on Shale Gas Resource Availability, Extraction Costs, and Fugitive Emissions
2.1. Levels of Supply
There remains a lack of authoritative data on the quantity and geographical distribution of
supplies of shale gas. McGlade et al. [7] provide a review of literature on shale gas reserves, alongside
an overview of terminology surrounding gas resources, reproduced in Table 1.
Table 1. Interpretation of resource terminology, reproduced from [7].
Name Short Description
Original gas in place (OGIP) Total volume present
Ultimately recoverable resources (URR) Total volume recoverable over all time
Technically recoverable resources (TRR) Recoverable with current technology
Economically recoverable resources (ERR) Economically recoverable with current technology
As early as 1997, Rogner [22] made an early estimate of volumes of original gas in place (OGIP) in
shale formations globally, assuming the gas content of global shales was comparable to that estimated
for those in the United States. However, Rogner warns that “in many cases [these estimates] are highly
speculative” [22]. A number of subsequent estimates of technically recoverable reserves (TRRs) apply
recovery rates of between 10% and 40% to Rogner’s estimates [7], the width of this range reflecting the
current level of high uncertainty around the viability of recovering shale gas from different areas.
In 2011, Advanced Resources International (ARI) made an assessment of TRRs of shale formations
in 14 regions outside of the US for the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), based upon
geology of shale formations, and data on pressure, temperature, porosity, and shale thickness
(where such data was available), using recovery rates between 15% and 35% [23]. McGlade et al. [7]
described the 2011 ARI study as “the new benchmark”, and combine published TRR estimates for a
number of regions to produce their own “low”, “central”, and “high” global estimates, broken down
into individual regions, of which the 2011 ARI estimates [23], as well as those of Medlock [24] form
the bulk. McGlade et al. give a central estimate of 193.2 Tcm (7195 EJ) of shale gas available globally.
In 2013, the ARI [25] published a more detailed study of TRR of shale resource, identifying 234 Tcm
(8220 EJ) in 26 regions, containing 41 individual countries, but acknowledge that their estimates remain
in the early stages. In 2015, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) [26]
published a study stating that around 215 Tcm (8006 EJ) are available globally, broadly in line with
McGlade and co-workers’ earlier estimates (although methodological details are not provided in the
BGR study, and this similarity may be due to a reliance on the a similar set of sources).
In some cases, more detailed studies of individual shale formations have suggested values
published by the ARI significantly overestimate the technical resource of shale. A 2012 study by the
Polish Geological Society [27] on supplies of shale gas estimates supplies around a tenth of those
predicted by the ARI [23], and notes the large uncertainty in estimated values, with highest estimates
still around half of that identified in the ARI’s 2013 study. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated the
Marcellus shale play contains 80% less gas than ARI’s 2011 estimate, following which the ARI revised
their estimate down for this play by 67% [28].
2.2. Field Depletion and Economic Feasibility
In addition to uncertainty around the ultimately and technically recoverable resources, there is
also considerable uncertainty surrounding the manner in which individual shale plays, and individual
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wells within those plays, may deplete, and hence the quantity of economically recoverable resources
from shale formations [29].
A typical shale gas play will contain a number of “sweet spots”, in which methane is more
concentrated. Typically, wells will be drilled in the most economic “sweet spots” first [30,31],
but sources differ on the future productivity of shale gas plays, particularly as productivity from wells
in “sweet spots” declines [32]. (It should be noted that Inman’s article has been criticised by the EIA for
the simplicity of its analysis, its perceived mis-portrayal of the relationship between the EIA and the
University of Texas, and its presentation of EIA’s scenarios as forecasts [33]. However, the magnitude
of difference between scenarios proposed by the EIA and projections presented by University of Texas
remains significant.) Hughes suggests that the economic investment currently required to build a
higher number of wells to replace declining supply from the most productive wells is not being,
and will not be, recuperated at current gas prices [31]. Furthermore, Hughes asserts that drop-off rates
of supply from shale gas wells assumed by many in the industry are unrealistically, low and lead to
overestimates of ultimate recoveries and economic performance [31]. In a later report, Hughes forecasts
“most likely” total production from major shale plays to be approximately two thirds of that projected
by the EIA up to 2040 [34]. Other commentators have contested this interpretation, taking recent
history of shale gas production in the USA as evidence that future estimates are realistic [35].
All of the above papers are focussed on US shale gas supply, and it is not straightforward to
determine their implication for global supply–cost curve estimations. Stevens [36] identifies a number
of geological, regulatory, and industrial factors likely to make shale gas extraction less favourable
in the UK than the US, concluding that policy interventions would be necessary to bring about a
“shale gas revolution” in the UK. However, these studies imply that there could be significant space
for downward revision of estimates where forecasts are produced with methods similar to those used
to project US shale production. This remains an area of on-going debate and analysis.
2.3. Methane Leakage Rates
The rate of methane leakage is a crucial factor in determining the climate impact of shale
gas extraction, as it is with all natural gas extraction (see Section 1.3 on known risks). Emissions
from natural gas are typically divided into “upstream” emissions associated with extraction,
and “downstream” emissions associated with storage and transmission. A summary of literature
on upstream methane emissions associated with shale gas extraction is provided in Figure 1 below,
and more details of these studies are provided in Supplementary Materials. These studies broadly fall
into one of four methodologies: literature review, bottom-up, atmospheric measurement, and satellite
measurement. Whilst downstream emissions represent a significant contributor to fugitive emissions,
these emissions are not considered in detail here, as they are expected to be similar for shale gas and
conventional sources of gas.
Bottom-up assessments sum sources of emissions measured in collaboration with industry when
gas is being extracted. Atmospheric measurements measure the concentration of methane in the
neighbourhood of sources of gas extraction (although the difficulty of source apportionment represents
a fundamental challenge in such studies). Results from satellite measurements taken prior to and
during the shale boom in the US are also included here. Both atmospheric and satellite measurements
indicate that emissions associated with shale gas extraction have often been significantly higher than
indicated by bottom-up studies. Miller et al. [37] reviewed atmospheric measurements in the US,
concluding that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) underestimates methane emissions in
its inventory studies by a factor of 1.5, implying that regional methane emissions due to fossil fuel
extraction and processing could be 4.9 ± 2.6 times larger than in the Emissions Database for Global
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) [38], described by the authors as the most comprehensive global
methane inventory.
Reports by Howard et al. [39,40] stated that a sensor failure is likely to have led to significant
underestimates in fugitive emissions in bottom-up studies, in particular the Allen and co-workers’
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major 2013 study of emissions in a large number of US gas wells [41]. Some of these claims have been
contested, and this remains an area of on-going debate and analysis [40,42].
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More details of these studies are provided in Supplementary Materials.
Balcombe and co-workers’ (2015) literature reviewed on fugitive emissions from shale gas
extraction pres nts a range of upstream methane leakage rates of 0.2%–1.8% assuming best practice.
This range excludes emissions from “super-emitters”, defined as “an emission source that leaks far
in excess of the average”. The authors state an expectation that these could be largely eliminated
if more stringent procedures were applied, but note technical uncertainty in some areas (liquids
unloading, in particular), and unresolved challenges in monitoring wells. A report prepared for the US
Environmental Defense Fund estimates that, taking savings into account, a 40% reduction in onshore
methane emissions is possible at a net cost of less than $0.01/Mcf (~$0.01/MJ) of gas produced [53],
and the In ernational Energy Agency ndicated that p licy directed towards reduction in upstream
meth e emission could play an important role i cli te change mitigation [54].
It should be noted that conventional gas extraction is also associated with fugitive emissions, and a
recent study identified higher production-normalised emissions rates in conventional gas extraction
sites than shale gas extraction sites in the Marcellus region, attributed to a greater prevalence of
avoidable process operating conditions (e.g., unresolved equipment maintenance issues) [55].
2.4. Shale Gas Supply Curves in Previous Energy System Modelling Studies
There have been a number of key studies on the impacts of shale gas on global greenhouse gas
emissions in recent years. The scope, methodologies, and key conclusions of these studies are outlined
in this section.
In a 2014 study, McJeon et al. [56] considered how reduction in all (conventional and unconventional)
gas costs would affect gr e house gas emissions in a scenario where there is no climat policy, comparing
results of a range of integrated assessment models of the future global energy system. McJeon et al. used
costs from the IIASA Global Energy Assessment (GEA) [57] (Figure 2), for which both conventional and
unconventional gas are relatively low compared to other sources, and assume gas extraction costs to halve
between 2010 and 2050 in an “abundant gas” scenario (described by McJeon et al. as “on the higher end”
compared to other studies). (It should be noted that, based upon a review of price history in fossil fuels,
McGlade [58] finds no clear evidence for significant long term reduction in fossil fuel extraction costs.
For shale gas specifically, McGlade reports a rapid reduction in costs when shale gas was first extracted in
the US, which soon plateaued.) No difference in methane leakage rates are assumed between shale and
non-shale sources. This study concludes that, in a “more abundant” gas scenario with no climate policy,
Energies 2017, 10, 158 7 of 22
gas displaces some coal, and some low carbon energy sources, and that abundant gas has little impact on
radiative forcing.
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GEA 2012 [57], energy technology systems analysis programme (ETSAP)-TIAM 2005 [60].
In a 2013 study, Gracceva et al. [59] considere the economic role of shale gas in the global energy
system up to 2040 under shale gas cost and supply scenarios described as “optimistic”, “pessi istic”,
and “most likely”. Gracceva et al. use an integrated assessment model (JRC energy technology syst ms
analysis program e (ETSAP)-TIAM) of the future energy system, with costs and resource potentials
updated by the JRC to account for new estimates of nventio al gas availability. Shale gas costs
are taken from recent regional cost a d resour pot ntial estimates [59]—th se indic te that th
cheapest shale gas is more expensive than the cheapest conv tional gas in the JRC ETSAP-TIAM
model, but, in the optimistic case an as a result of extraction cost r ductions, a little cheaper than some
conventi al gas used prior to 2040 [58]. This study finds a notable r le for shale gas only when taking
the most ptimistic r source size assumptions coupled with the m st optimistic cost assumptions
(45% of an “ ptimistic” estimate of ap roximately 350 Tcm (~13,000 EJ) shale gas reserves extractable
at an “optimistic” cost of $4.5/GJ).
McGlade and Ekins’ 2014 study [61] uses an integrated assess ent odel of the future energy
system (TIAM-UCL) with resource and cost estimates as described in McGlade’s [58] doctoral thesis
to calculate the regional distribution of fossil fuels unburnt hen li iting global ar i to 2 ◦ .
This study suggests that 68% of conventional, and 82% of unconve ti al gas should remain unburnt
by 2050, and does not explicitly specify the proportion of unburnt shale gas.
The IEA’s 2011 “Golden Age of Gas” report [62] estimates remaining recoverable resources and
price ranges of conventional and unconventional gas by region, although the methodology used to
derive these estimates is unclear. Extraction costs for shale gas are esti ated only in orth erica,
where the range is similar to conve tio al gas, but marginally above conventional gas prices in Russia
and the Middle East.
Figure 2 shows the global supply/cost curves for conventional gas only, and for all gas including
shale and ot er u conventio al sources of gas (coal bed methane and tight gas) used in the above
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studies. (In McGlade’s analysis, a relatively large uncertainty range is included in both conventional
and unconventional resources. In Gracceva et al.’s study, estimates of shale gas resource availabilities
and production costs described as “high”, “most likely”, and “low” are included for shale gas. In both
cases, middle ranges are included here.) This demonstrates the large difference in assumptions about
supply made by a number of reputable sources, although it should be noted that in all cases TRR shale
resources are estimated based upon the assessment published by McGlade [7]. In Gracceva et al.’s [59]
supply curves, cost assumptions are based upon a JRC report by Thonhauser et al. which draws
on experience in US wells to estimate costs in Europe (estimation methods for other regions are not
clear) [63]. In McGlade’s [58] supply curves, regional shale gas extraction costs are based upon estimates
for specific wells described in a conference presentation by Medlock [24]. Medlock’s presentation does
not include a detailed methodology, but does state that “drilling and completion costs [are] estimated
using known North American plays, econometrically fit to drilling depth and reservoir pressure”.
It is not clear whether other geological factors such as field size and clay content, regional expertise,
and regulatory frameworks are taken into account. Stevens [36] notes that these factors could result in
significantly higher costs in the UK than the USA, and many of these factors would also be likely to
apply to other regions.
Figure 3 shows gas supply curves separated into non-shale (predominantly conventional) and
shale resources. Shale gas in both ETSAP and the JRC’s marginal cost of extraction curves is divided
into three cost bands in each of the fifteen regions considered in the global ETSAP-TIAM energy system
model. From these curves, it is apparent that shale gas extraction is only currently cost competitive
with the least expensive non-shale gas extraction if McGlade’s estimates of the costs of non-shale gas
extraction (the highest of those considered) are taken alongside ETSAP’s estimates (based on McGlade’s
analysis) of the costs of shale gas extraction (the lowest of those considered). In addition, the shale gas
extraction costs in the ETSAP-TIAM model are assumed to fall in line with extraction costs in the least
expensive region (identified as Australia) by 2020, where extraction costs are assumed not to change
from 2005 levels. As these costs are based on Medlock’s [24] 2012 presentation, which appears to be
based only on certain geological details of wells, rather than regional experience, and McGlade [58]
finds no clear evidence for significant long term reduction in fossil fuel extraction costs, it is not clear
whether this is a reasonable assumption. Figure 3a demonstrates that in both the ETSAP-TIAM and
JRC analysis, there is around 5000 EJ of non-shale gas available at a cost of below approximately $2/GJ.
A comparison with Figure 3b shows that this gas is less costly than the cheapest shale gas extraction.
In addition to assessment of global supply, a number of supply curves have been published for
shale gas in individual plays and for the USA alone. US supply curves provided by Hilaire et al. [64]
and Jacoby et al. [65] report a similar quantities of shale gas to the JRC’s [58] central estimate, but at
a slightly higher cost. Those of Petak et al. [66] fall between JRC and ETSAP-TIAM [59] estimates.
Gülen et al. [67] model supply and cost of gas divided in to ten tiers in the Barnett shale in Texas,
emphasising the importance of high resolution sampling in obtaining accurate results.
We note that in all cases future cost and resource estimates are necessarily subject to significant
uncertainty, although this is often not well quantified, and more central estimates are not necessarily
better than more extreme estimates. The impact of shale gas on the energy system could be larger or
smaller if costs and quantities of supply are found to differ significantly from these estimates.
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factor such that mean gas cost up to 14,000 EJ are identical to those in McGlade’s thesis, and non-shale
unconventional costs are assumed identical to those used by the JRC. This curve is used in scenario
runs in order to provide a reasonable geographical distribution of gas at cost levels similar to those
specified b Mc lade.
2.5. Analytical Gap
These studies leave an analytical gap, as there is yet to be a systematic comparison of
shale/non-shale scenarios on reference scenarios with no climate-policy and 2 ◦C-consistent mitigation
scenarios, accounting for methane leakage rate uncertainty. This analysis aims to fill that gap by:
(1) Setting out plausible scenarios of cost relativities of shale and conventional gas resources,
by reflecting existing uncertainty in the costs of both conventional and shale gas, rather than just
uncertainty in shale gas costs. We achieve this by considering a high, medium and low case for
both shale and conventional gas costs.
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(2) Using an energy system model (TIAM-Grantham) to calculate cost-optimised energy system
pathways to 2100, consistent with the 2 ◦C long-term temperature goal, under the cost scenarios
outlined above.
(3) Exploring the climate change consequences of plausible rates of methane leakage from shale gas,
to understand the additional warming that might occur if leakage rates were higher than for
non-shale gas.
3. Methods
The analysis of the impact of different assumptions on shale gas resource availability and cost
is centred on the use of a global energy systems model, TIAM-Grantham, to explore reference and
mitigation scenarios to 2100. TIAM-Grantham is the Grantham Institute of Imperial College London’s
version of the ETSAP-TIAM model, which is the global, 15-region incarnation of the TIMES model
generator, as developed and maintained by the energy technology systems analysis programme
(ETSAP), and described in detail in References [21,68]. The model is a linear programming tool
representing in rich resource and technological detail all elements of the reference energy system (RES)
for each region represented, mapping energy commodity flows all the way from their extraction and
refining to their distribution and end-use. In a typical run, the TIAM model will optimise the energy
system for given climate constraints through maximising total producer and consumer welfare over a
given time horizon while accounting for elastic demand responses to energy prices.
The model uses exogenous inputs of factors such as gross domestic product (GDP), population,
household size and sectorial output shares to project future energy service demands across the
agricultural, commercial, industrial, residential and transport sectors in each region. Energy system
data such as technology costs, resource supply curves and annual resource availability are also input
into the model. In solving, the model allows trade in energy commodities between regions.
The TIAM-Grantham integrated assessment model is used to calculate a cost optimised energy
system pathway to 2100, first in a reference scenario under which no climate or emissions constraints
are applied, and secondly under a global constraint on CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial
processes, of 1340 GtCO2 over the course of the 21st century, which gives a 50% likelihood of keeping
2100 temperature change below 2 ◦C compared to pre-industrial levels [69]. The emissions constraint
allows for the meeting of the weak end of Cancun pledges to 2020, and then global coordinated
mitigation action thereafter, in order to meet the 21st century cumulative CO2 constraint [69]. It should
be noted that the resulting CO2 emissions pathway is likely to be very different to that which would
follow Parties’ INDC pledges in 2030, which result in 2030 emissions levels broadly similar to 2020
levels presented here [70]. A further model run is carried out consistent with a 50% likelihood of
keeping 2100 temperature change below 1.75 ◦C, close to the limit of temperature change feasible
within the constraints applied to the model.
In this exercise the TIAM-Grantham model is calibrated to standard growth projections based
on the “Shared Socio-Economic Pathways 2” (SSP 2) socio-economic assumptions [71] where global
economic output grows from (2005 US, PPP) $68 trillion in 2010 to $539 trillion in 2100. A discount
rate of 5% is assumed (a standard societal discount rate value used in global energy system modelling
exercises [69,72,73]) over the period 2012–2100. All technology and resource costs are taken from
ETSAP’s 2012 TIAM model version with the exception of gas resources, for which a number of supply
curve scenarios for conventional and non-conventional resources are assumed, as outlined in Table 2.
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Table 2. Conventional and unconventional gas cost/supply scenarios.
Cost Scenario Description
Low Cost Conventional (LC) Conventional, tight gas, and coal bed methane cost curves fromETSAP-TIAM 2006 [60] (green lines in Figure 3a).
Mid Cost Conventional (MC) Conventional, tight gas, and coal bed methane cost curves fromJRC [59] (blue lines in Figure 3a).
High Cost Conventional (HC)
Conventional, tight gas, and coal bed methane cost curves from
JRC [59] scaled such that conventional costs are in line with
McGlade [58] (orange line in Figure 3a).
Low Cost Shale (LS)
Shale cost curves from ETSAP-TIAM 2012 model version,
based upon McGlade [58]. Costs are similar to McGlade’s thesis
up to 2015, with costs in all regions falling to that of lowest cost
region in McGlade [58] by 2020 (green lines in Figure 3b).
Mid Cost Shale (MS)
Shale cost curves from ETSAP-TIAM 2012 model version based
upon McGlade [58], adapted such that there is no fall in costs in
any region during the model run (light green line in Figure 3b).
High Cost Shale (HS) Shale cost curves from JRC [59] mid case (blue lines in Figure 3b).
No Shale (NS) No shale gas extraction.
No Unconventional Gas (NU) No shale gas, tight gas, or coal bed methane extraction.
A central set of reference and mitigation scenarios have been carried out with a core set of
combinations of the above scenarios:
• High cost conventional/Low-cost shale gas (denoted “HC_LS”);
• Medium-cost conventional/medium cost shale (denoted “MC_MS”);
• Low-cost conventional/High-cost shale (denoted “LC_HS”);
• Medium-cost conventional/No shale (denoted “MC_NS”).
Activity bounds, which refer to constraints placed upon the rate of extraction of existing gas
resources in any given year, are defined based upon those used in the ETSAP-TIAM model at a
maximum of 10% extraction of total resource per year for conventional proven reserves, and 5% for
unconventional reserves and new discoveries. (A sensitivity analysis on the MC_NS scenario shows
that use of activity bounds based upon the JRC model, in which 1%–5% of each resource may be
extracted per year, dependent on date and resource type, changes uptake of gas by less than 1% in any
year and changes discounted energy system cost by less than 0.01%.).
In order to consider the impact of more limited availability of funding for low carbon electricity
technologies when shale gas reserves are exploited, we also calculate pathways to 2100 in which the
capital financing rates (the required annual repayment rate of an initial capital loan for the construction
of these plants) for low carbon electricity technologies are increased.
We also consider energy system pathways in a “dash for shale gas” scenario, in which
governments implement policy resulting in rapid extraction of shale gas, despite it being economically
suboptimal (for example, in order to ensure energy security, under a perception that extraction costs
are lower than they turn out to be, or as a result of regulatory capture). In this scenario, shale gas
extraction rates are imposed in which all shale gas from low and medium cost bands (representing
80% of the estimated shale gas resource) is extracted by 2050 in each region.
Finally, the potential impact of fugitive methane leakage is explicitly considered for those scenarios
in which a high quantity of shale gas is used, through assuming three illustrative upstream methane
leakage rates (of 0.5%, 1% and 5% in excess of methane leakage from conventional sources) which is not
mitigated through specific methane mitigation measures. This serves to provide a useful illustration
of the potential benefit of robustly monitoring and mitigating any additional methane leakage from
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shale gas over and above conventional gas sources, and the potential risks if such measures prove to
be ineffective.
4. Results
4.1. Energy System and Mitigation Costs
Table 3 shows the cost of the discounted global energy system calculated for a range of cost and
availability combinations of conventional and shale gas in both the reference scenarios and mitigation
scenarios. This cost includes all primary energy fuels and energy conversion technologies, spanning
extraction to end-use of energy throughout the global economy. Table 3 also shows the mitigation
cost for each conventional/shale gas cost combination, defined as the difference between the cost of
the energy system in the mitigation and reference scenarios. Costs are shown in both absolute terms
and as a percentage of the present value of future global GDP over the period 2012–2100. In each
case, mitigation costs fall in the range 33–35 trillion 2005 US$ (1.05% and 1.11% of global GDP). This is
towards the lower end of the $34–288 trillion previously reported by Gambhir et al. [69] and the
$12–120 trillion reported by Clarke et al. [73], each across models and scenarios.
Table 3. Cumulative discounted cost of the energy system, and cumulative discounted cost of mitigation.
Conventional Gas
Cost Scenario
Unconventional
Gas Cost Scenario Abbreviation
Present Value Energy System Cost over
the Period 2012–2100 *
2 ◦C
Scenario/Trillion
2005 US$
Reference
Scenario/Trillion
2005 US$
Mitigation
Cost/Trillion 2005
US$ (%GDP)
With shale
Low Cost High Cost Shale LC_HS 635.2 601.0 34.1 (1.09)
Mid Cost Mid Cost Shale MC_MS 641.8 607.1 34.7 (1.11)
High Cost Low Cost Shale HC_LS 643.2 609.1 34.1 (1.09)
No shale
Low Cost No Shale LC_NS 634.4 ‡ 601.3 33.1 (1.05)
Mid Cost No Shale MC_NS 642.9 609.0 33.9 (1.08)
High Cost No Shale HC_NS 645.7 612.7 33.0 (1.05)
Notes: In all cases the rate of extraction of shale gas is optimised in order to maximise welfare, and a standard
capital financing rate of 10% is used for low carbon electricity technologies. * Discount rate 5% used to calculate
cumulative discounted cost; ‡ The slightly higher 2 ◦C scenario cost for LC_HS than LC_NS is likely to be the result
of shale gas usage in the period up to 2020 (during which period the model is optimising towards meeting weak
Cancun pledges) which turns out to be suboptimal to meet a 2 ◦C target up to 2100.
As shown in Table 3, the 2 ◦C-consistent energy system cost in the mitigation scenarios is similar
in all cases, indicating that differences in gas availability are not likely to have a large impact on
the feasibility and cost of meeting a 2 ◦C target. The 1.39% increase in energy system cost from the
LC_NS to the HC_LS scenarios is relatively large compared to the 0.31% increase from the MC_NS
to the MC_LS scenarios (both with and without a 2 ◦C target). This indicates that system cost is
more sensitive to uncertainties in cost for conventional gas cost than for shale gas. Energy system
pathways associated with other combinations of costs of conventional gas and cost and availability of
shale gas have been explored, and are described using similar nomenclature in a table provided in
Supplementary Materials.
4.2. Primary Energy Share of Natural Gas
Figure 4 shows the proportion of total primary energy supplied by all natural gas and by shale gas
alone in the LC_HS, MC_MS, HC_LS, and MC_NS scenarios in 2 ◦C consistent energy systems). In all
cases, natural gas (i.e., conventional and shale gas in combination) makes a significant contribution
to total primary energy supply in the period 2020–2040, with the natural gas share of total primary
energy peaking in 2030 and then diminishing rapidly thereafter, as energy supply from fossil fuel is
substituted by an increasing penetration of renewable energy sources. Figure 4 also illustrates that the
most influential factor on global primary natural gas demand in the mitigation scenarios is the cost of
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conventional gas, since there is significantly higher gas demand only in the scenario with the lower
end of the cost range for conventional gas (LC_HS).
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In the HC_LS, scenario, 13% of total primary energy is provided by shale gas in the period
2016–2040. In a similar scenario without shale gas (HC_NS), total primary energy demand is within
0.5% of that in HC_LS, with the energy which would otherwise be supplied by shale gas predominantly
provided by oth r sources of natural gas (an additional 8% of tot l primary energy from conventional
sources, and 1% each from tight gas and coal bed methane), but to some extent also coal, renewables
and oil (2%, 1%, and 1%, respectively). In the MC_MS and LC_HS scenarios, respectively, 4% and
0.3% of total primary energy is supplied by shale gas in the period 2016–2040. In similar scenarios
with no shale gas, energy consumption varies by less than 0.01%, with energy otherwise supplied
by shale gas predominantly met by other sources of gas (an additional 1% of total primary energy
from conventional sources, and 2% from co l bed methane in MCNS, and differen es in each energy
vector <1% in LCNS). Temporal profiles of changes in sources of primary energy consumption with
and without shale gas in each of these cost scenarios are provided in Supplementary Materials.
In no scenari or regions is there any extraction of shale gas from any but the least expensive cost
bands prior to 2040. In the LC_HS and MC_MS scenarios, there is no significant extraction of shale
from any but the least expensive bands prior to 2060. In practice, it may not be straightforward to
identify whether a fi ld is likely t be among the most cost-effective prior to significant investment in
that field. Therefore, potential economic benefits of shale gas extraction even from these sources may
be challenging to realise. In the period 2016–2040, 4600–5500 EJ of natural gas is extracted between
scenarios, equivalent to 60%–72% of pr ven global reserves, as estimated by the Ener y Information
Administration in 2014 [74], and 65%–82% of the range presented by the GEA in 2012 [57].
In the MC_NS scenario, 4% less natural gas is used across the entire period 2012–2100 than in the
MC_MS scenario, but more gas is extracted from non-shale sources. Conventional gas increases its
share in total natural gas supply from 57% to 69%, tight gas from 6% to 9%, and coal bed methane from
16% to 21%. (We calculate an additional MC scenario with no shale gas, coal bed methane, or tight gas
extraction. In this scenario, nergy system costs are higher by 0.07% of GDP, and total gas extraction
lower by 18%, when compared to the MC_MS scenario.)
On the demand side, when low cost shale gas is added to a scenario with high conventional
costs (i.e., HC_LS compar d to HC_NS), gas extraction increases by 14% in 2030 (the year of peak gas
extraction in our study), and coal extraction reduces by 26%. Switching of demand from gas to coal
predominantly occurs in the industrial sector, but the introduction of shale gas is also associated with
small shifts from coal to gas in electricity generation, oil to gas in road transport, and electricity to gas
in the residential sector. A more detailed breakdown of the energy mix, and a sectorial breakdown of
the demand side indicating where additional gas is used when shale gas is added to the energy system,
and which fuels are displaced, is provided in Supplementary Materials.
In a pathway consistent with a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.75 ◦C (close to the
lowest temperature rise achievable using TIAM-Grantham) in the MC_NS scenario, the global gas
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demand for the period 2016–2040 is 4400 EJ (compared to 4700 EJ for a 2 ◦C consistent pathway with
the same gas costs and availabilities). This implies that the role of all gas, including that derived
from shale sources, should be diminished rather than increased in order to meet more ambitious
temperature targets as set out in the in the UNFCCC Paris Agreement [75].
Gas extraction in reference scenarios with no action to mitigate climate change is provided in
Supplementary Materials, alongside the temporal evolution of total energy demand, and more details
of the overall mix of energy resources.
4.3. Impacts of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) on Gas Share of Global Primary Energy
The total quantity of carbon captured between 2020 and 2100 (the period of globally coordinated
mitigation action in our 2 ◦C scenarios) is within 5% in all core gas cost scenarios. Figure 5a shows the
rate of carbon capture from a range of sources in a 2 ◦C consistent MC_NS pathway. Figure 5b shows
the cumulative demand for conventional and shale gas in a number of gas cost scenarios over the same
period, indicating that the dependence of the future energy system on natural gas as a whole, and shale
gas in particular, itself depends on whether carbon capture and storage technology is available. In the
mitigation scenarios without CCS, there is a 38%–47% lower demand for total natural gas compared
to the mitigation scenarios with CCS. Shale gas demand is reduced by 67% where its cost is highest
(the LC_HS scenario) and by 20%–26% for the other mitigation scenarios. These scenarios are purely
illustrative, since without CCS, the TIAM-Grantham model is unable to meet future energy demand
and stay within the 2 ◦C consistent CO2 budget over the 21st century, without recourse to a theoretical
backstop technology which mitigates CO2 at a cost of 2005 US$10,000/tCO2. These scenarios are
therefore deemed to indicate economic and technical infeasibility of meeting the 2 ◦C goal within the
constraints applied to the TIAM-Grantham model.
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4.4. Region-Specific Results
Only in the HC_LS scenario is there significant extraction of shale gas outside of the USA prior
to 2030, and in the LS_HS scenario, there is no extraction of shale gas outside of the USA until 2050.
This is in part due to relatively high costs of shale gas extraction in most regions outside of the USA
and Canada, and in part due to trade links between countries. Most of the least expensive conventional
gas reserves are located in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East (in the ETSAP-TIAM data
set, 66% of reserves available below $2/GJ are in these two regions, and only 11% in the Americas),
and pipeline infrastructure allows the export of significant quantities of natural gas from these countries
to Eastern and Western Europe, China, and India. These resources are only available to the Americas
via relatively expensive LNG transport. Extraction rates of all natural gas, shale gas, and coal in each
region in the period 2012–2020 are presented for the three core scenarios, LC_HS, MC_MS, and HC_LS
in Supplementary Materials. However, we emphasise that our model is global in scale, and more
detailed regional models are necessary to properly understand regional dynamics.
4.5. Impact on Development of Other Low-Carbon Technologies
In order to consider the possible impact of more limited availability of finances for low carbon
electricity technologies on the cost of a climate constrained energy system, we calculate energy system
pathways under scenarios in which capital financing rates for low-carbon electricity technologies
(here taken to include solar, wind, tidal, hydro, geothermal, nuclear power, and biomass for electricity
generation) are increased. These scenarios are used to illustrate the potential sensitivity of the energy
system cost to any increase in financing rates for low-carbon electricity technologies, which could occur
as a result of either competing capital demands for shale gas, or uncertainty surrounding the level
of policy support for low-carbon electricity technologies. Energy system costs under these scenarios
are presented in Table 4. The exact values chosen changes to capital financing rates are necessarily
somewhat arbitrary, as there is little evidence surrounding the impact of shale gas investment on capital
availability (and hence the cost of capital) for low-carbon electricity technologies. As such, results in
this section serve to illustrate the potential mitigation cost impact of different capital financing rate
increases, rather than directly addressing the mitigation cost impact of investment in shale gas.
Table 4. Cumulative discounted cost of the energy system, and cumulative discounted cost of mitigation
in high financing rate scenarios.
Conventional Gas
Cost Scenario
Unconventional Gas
Cost Scenario
Capital Financing Rates
for Low Carbon
Electricity Technologies
Present Value Energy System Cost over
the Period 2012–2100 *
2 ◦C
Scenario/Trillion
2005 US$
Reference
Scenario/Trillion
2005 US$
Mitigation
Cost/Trillion 2005
US$ (%GDP)
Low Cost High Cost Shale 10% 635.2 601.0 34.1 (1.09)
Mid Cost Mid Cost Shale 10% 641.8 607.1 34.7 (1.11)
High Cost Low Cost Shale 10% 643.2 609.1 34.1 (1.09)
Low Cost High Cost Shale 11% 636.7 601.0 35.6 (1.13)
Mid Cost Mid Cost Shale 11% 643.0 607.1 35.9 (1.14)
High Cost Low Cost Shale 11% 644.2 609.1 35.1 (1.12)
Low Cost High Cost Shale 20% 652.8 601.0 51.7 (1.65)
Mid Cost Mid Cost Shale 20% 659.5 607.1 52.5 (1.67)
High Cost Low Cost Shale 20% 660.9 609.1 51.8 (1.65)
* Discount rate 5% used to calculate cumulative discounted cost.
Table 4 shows that, when comparing the LC_HS, MC_MS and HC_LS scenarios with and without
the increased capital financing rates for low-carbon electricity technologies, a 1% increase in capital
financing rates increases mitigation costs by 3%–4% (1.0–1.5 trillion US$2005) over the period 2012–2100.
An extreme case in which capital finance rates double leads to mitigation costs which are 51%–52%
higher than the standard financing rate cases.
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4.6. Impact of a “Dash for Shale Gas”
In order to consider the impact of a “dash for shale gas” on the cost of a climate constrained
energy system, we calculate energy system pathways under scenarios in which an extraction profile
of shale gas is imposed, such that all shale gas from lower and medium cost sources (representing
80% of the estimated total shale gas resource in considered shale gas cost curves) is extracted by 2050.
Figure 6 shows the proportion of total primary energy supplied by all natural gas and by shale gas
alone in the LC_HS, MC_MS, HC_LS scenarios under such a constraint. Energy system costs in these
scenarios are presented in Table 5.
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Conventional 
Gas Cost 
Scenario 
Unconventional 
Gas Cost 
Scenario 
Shale Gas 
Extraction 
Rate 
Capital Financing 
Rates for Low 
Carbon Electricity 
Technologies 
Present Value Energy System Cost over the Period 
2012–2100 * 
2 °C Scenario/
$Trillion 
Reference 
Scenario/ 
$Trillion 
Mitigation
Cost/$Trillion 
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Table 5. Cumulative discounted cost of the energy system, and cumulative discounted cost of mitigation
in “dash for shale gas” scenarios.
Conventional Gas
Cost Scenario
Unconve tional Gas
Cost Scenario
Shale Gas
Extraction Rate
Capital Financing Rates
for Low Carbon
Electricity Technologies
Present Value Energy System Cost over the Period 2012–2100 *
2 ◦C
Scenario/$Trillion
Reference
Scenario/$Trillion
Mitigation
Cost/$Trillion (%GDP)
Low Cost High Cost Dash 10% 646.9 601.0 45.9 (1.46)
Mid Cost Mid Cost Dash 10% 649.0 607.1 41.9 (1.33)
High Cost Low Cost Dash 10% 650.6 609.1 41.6 (1.32)
Low Cost High Cost Dash 11% 648.8 601.0 47.8 (1.52)
Mid Cost Mid Cost Dash 11% 651.0 607.1 43.9 (1.40)
High Cost Low Cost Dash 11% 652.7 609.1 43.6 (1.39)
Low Cost High Cost Dash 20% 664.9 601.0 63.9 (2.03)
Mid Cost Mid Cost Dash 20% 667.5 607.1 60.5 (1.92)
High Cost Low Cost Dash 20% 669.4 609.1 60.3 (1.92)
* Discount rate 5% used to calculate cumulative discounted cost.
This analysis suggests that a dash for shale gas could significantly increase mitigation cost,
and t e cost of the energy system under a climate constrained scenario. With no increase in capital
financing rates for low carbon el ctricity technologies, a d sh for shale gas leads to an increase in
global mitigation cost to 1.3%–1.5% of global GDP depending on cost and availability of conventional
and shale gas, relative to 1.1% of GDP with no dash for gas (a mitigation cost increase of 21%–35%).
When combined with an increase in capital financing rates to 11% or 20%, mitigation costs rise to
1.4%–1.5% and 1.9%–2.0% of GDP, respectively.
These results follow from the analysis of shale and conventional gas cost relativities as presented
in Section 2, indicating that there is significant conventional gas available at a cost below that of shale
gas. As such, rapid extraction of shale gas is far from cost-optimal in a global context.
4.7. Rates of Decarbonisation
Figure 7 shows that the exploitation of shale gas reserves has very little impact on the cost-optimal
rate of decarbonisation of the global energy system throughout the 21st century in the 2 ◦C
mitigation scenarios.
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Figure 7. Global fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions in a range of 2 ◦C scenarios.
The “dash for shale” scenario differs slightly from other scenarios in the first half of the
21st century, with an average annual CO2 reduction rate of 4.6% in the decade 2020–2030 (compared
to 4.9%–5.0% for all of the other scenarios shown), and 4.1% in the decade 2030–2040 (compared to
3.4%–3.5% for the other scenarios). This changed profile of emissions reductions, with less effort in the
next deca nd more in the one after, is consistent with f rcing relatively higher carbo shale gas
into the en r y system initiall . We do n t however deem t is relatively small differe ce in rates of
decarbonisation to be sufficient to draw specific conclusions about the impact of exploitation of shale
gas on the feasibility of mitigation. In all scenarios, the near-term rates of decarbonisation required are
around 5% per year in the decade 2020–2030, a level unprecedented at a global level and therefore
all likely to be challengi g to achieve in practice (although higher rates have been achieved at an
individual country level [76]).
4.8. Methane Emissions
In this section, we consider the implications of a scenario in which policy has been enacted
with a 2 ◦C target, under the assumption that leakage rates are identical to that of conventional gas.
We then consider the temperature implications if methane leakage rates turn out to be higher (as a
result of ineffective regulation and policy, or u expected challeng s in monitoring and missions
reduction). This temperature calcul tion is based on analysis by Met Office Hadley Centre as described
in References [69,77].
Figure 8 shows that, for the high cost conventional, low cost shale (HC_LS) scenario, in which
exploitation of shale gas is highest among scenarios with no forced extraction, there would be a
relatively small additional global warming to 2100 if the additional leakage rate of fugitive methane
from shale gas extraction is 1% or les . However, a leak ge rate of 5% above conventional gas would
lead to a notable impact, with median global temperature exceeding 2 ◦C by 2065, and reaching 2.06 ◦C
in 2100, 0.08 ◦C above the median temperature change of 1.98 ◦C in the scenario where no fugitive
methane leakage is assumed above that of conventional gas extraction. If there were a dash for shale
gas, then a fugitive methane leakage rate of 5% would result in a 50% likelihood of the 2 ◦C threshold
being exceeded in 2050 (see Supplem nt ry Materials).
This analysis thus suggests that the reduction of fugitive m thane leakage could be an important
factor in keeping global average temperature change “well below 2 ◦C” as stated in the UNFCCC Paris
Agreement [75]. Whilst the highest leakage rate scenarios may not occur, should sufficient mitigation
measures be put in place, there is not yet sufficient detail available in plans for emission reductions
(particularly surrounding well-monitoring when using large numbers of wells, as typically required
for shale gas extraction), as discussed in Section 2.3. As such, whilst our higher leakage rate scenario is
not a forecast of the probable future, it serves as a useful illustration of the degree to which effective
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control or mitigation of fugitive methane is important if large-scale extraction of shale gas were to
take place.
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Figure 8. Median temperature change with different assumptions on unmitigated fugitive methane
leakage from shale wells, high cost conventional, low cost shale (HC_LS) scenario.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Considerable uncertainty around shale and conventional gas resource availability and extraction
costs suggests that a scenario analysis is useful in understanding the potential range of future impacts of
shale gas extractio o a range of factors including global energy system costs, rates of decarbonisation
and the demand for n tural gas, in global energy system which ra sitions t low-carbon in order to
limit global warming to below 2 ◦C in 2100.
Three primary cost combination scenarios of shale and conventional gas resources are explored in
this study: high cost conventional, low cost shale (HC_LS); medium cost conventional, medium cost
shale (MC_MS); and low cost conventional, high cost shale (LC_HS). These scenarios all show that there
is a significant near-term, but diminishing lon -term, role for natural gas as a whole in a low-carbon
energy system transition. When the lowest cost hale ga supply estimates ar combined with the
highest cost conventional gas estimates (the HC_LS scenario), shale gas alone could make up more
than 10% of global primary energy supply in the period 2020–2040 in an economic welfare-maximising
2 ◦C consistent energy system transition pathway. However, in all other considered cost scenarios,
shale gas makes up 6% or less of global primary energy supply in the same period. In other words,
natural gas as a whole could be an imp rtant bridge to a low-carbon future over the next tw decades,
but shale gas (at least according to the resource cost and availability data used in this study) would only
constitute a large share of that gas supply if its cost is at the lower end of estimates and conventional
gas costs are at the higher end. Moreover, if carbon capture and storage technology is not available in
2 ◦C scenarios, the role of natural gas as a whole and shale gas in particular would be significantly
reduced. Th role of natural gas is further diminished in a 1.75 ◦C scenari , close to the limit of what is
achievable using our model.
Of all scenarios explored, the 2 ◦C scenario with the lowest energy system cost is that which has
low conventional gas cost assumptions, indicating that the future cost of conventional gas is more
influential on future energy system costs than the cost of shale gas. The current evidence does not
suggest that—on a global level—shale gas would significantly reduce the cost of achieving the 2 ◦C
goal. This is before accounting for any impact that shale gas investment could have on investment
in low-carbon electricity technologies, where analysis suggests that capital constraints leading to a
1%-point increase (from 10% to 11%) in cost of capital for these electricity technologies would increase
mitigation costs by 3%–4% across the conventional/shale gas cost scenarios explored. If there is a
concerted effort to exploit global shale gas reserves in spite of these resources not necessarily being the
Energies 2017, 10, 158 19 of 22
least-cost gas resources, then the analysis presented here suggests this could increase global mitigation
costs towards a 2 ◦C goal by 21%–35%.
There is little discernible impact of shale gas exploitation on global CO2 emissions reduction rates,
which are comparable across scenarios. Finally, although there is considerable uncertainty over fugitive
methane leakage rates from shale wells, the analysis presented here suggests there could be additional
global warming in 2100 if the average fugitive methane leakage from shale gas is higher than that of
conventional gas sources, and is not mitigated, so it is clearly important that current challenges in
monitoring and mitigation must be overcome before embarking on widespread extraction of gas from
shale formations.
In summary, provided fugitive emission rates can be controlled, this analysis suggests that global
shale gas availability would not make a significant (positive or negative) impact on the cost and
feasibility of an energy system transition consistent with the 2 ◦C goal, nor significantly affect the
cost-optimal decarbonisation pathway globally. However, unsurprisingly, any forced exploitation of
shale gas even where uneconomic compared to conventional sources of gas could lead to higher global
mitigation costs. These findings should be taken in the context of the uncertainties already outlined,
whilst also noting that they derive from one global energy systems model only.
Supplementary Materials: Supplementary materials can be found at www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/10/2/158/s1.
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